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ABSTRACT 
This report deals with systems to achieve a satisfactory apportion-
ment of representatives in the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament. 
In par. 2 the present system is discussed. It has the well-known 
fault that the greater parties are favoured as to their representation. 
Another system without this bias, simple and straightforward, was presen-
ted in the Netherlands in 1973 and is described in par. 3. 
As a matter of fact the allocation of seats in Parliament according 
to the vote distribution can be considered a problem of minimizing the in-
equality between the repartition of votes and that of seats. Then some in-
equality coefficient should be minimized. In par. 4 we discuss three designs; 
moreover, a striking difference is shown to exist between the inequality 
coefficients which are minimized by the systems of par. 2 and 3. 
An additional remark is made referring to non-proportional represen-
tation. 
Finally, in par. 5 we present a system of weighted votes to be used 
when voting in Parliament. This system corrects perfectly the unfairness 
in the seat distribution, which is always present to a certain extent. 
KEY WORDS & PHRASES: Apportionment of representatives, minimization 
*) This report has been submitted for publication elsewhere and is not 
for review. 
**) Dr J.H.C. Lisman is a former advisor of the Central Planning Bureau, 
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PREFACE 
This report presents a mathematical study of a problem and possible 
solutions in a somewhat unexpected domain: politics. It attempts to quantify 
a number of objections of the authors (and of many others) to the present 
system of apportionment of representatives in the Second Chamber of Dutch 
Parliament and it indicates a possibly suitable substitute system. Its 
presentation is such that interested politicians should be able to trace 
and understand the main results. 
The authors like to thank the Mathematical Centre for the publication 
of this report in the NN-series and, in particular, J. Nuis for his careful 
comments, both formally and privately. They emphasize that any subjective 
formulations, intentional or unintentional, express their own personal 
opinion. 
l • INTRODUCTION 
Each four years new representatives in the Second Chamber of Dutch 
Parliament have to be elected. Political parties then nominate their can-
didates and the number of votes for these parties has to be translated in-
to the number of representatives, which sum up to 150. This translation is 
a question of mathematics, under political desires and constraints. If 
one aims to reach at an apportionment of representatives which fits the 
vote distribution best, then some optimum procedure may be appropriate. 
In practice, however, matters are handled differently. Actually, the prob-
lem is in the field of Operational Research, but politics and O.R. are no 
neighbours! As a matter of fact politicians and jurists concerned with pub-
lic government and law-making are not acquainted with the ideas of O.R. 
and there is only a modest start in jurimetrics, whereas politicometrics has 
been hardly born. 
In par. 2 we first describe the present system of apportionment of 
representatives in the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament, and the main 
fault of this method. Par. 3 refers to a better system. In par. 4 we turn 
to other solutions by applying simple optimization techniques. Moreover, a 
striking difference between certain minimizing properties of the systems of 
par. 2 and 3 is described. Finally, in par. 5 we present a new refinement 
in the system of voting in colleges: the weighted vote. 
2. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF APPORTIONMENT 
The present system in The Netherla! is called that of proportional 
representation: political parties are entitled to a number of representa-
tives in the Second Chamber of Parliament, which is proportional to the 
number of votes they have scored in the country as a whole. 
The number of representatives in the Chamber amounts to 150. The 
total number of valid votes divided by 150 is called the quota (Q). At 
present there is a so-called voting-threshold, which means that a party 
should have scored at least this quota in order to receive one or more 
seats. Now the total number of votes of each party which is admitted is 
divided by the quota, and the integer parts of the resulting numbers show 
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how many representatives for each party enter the Chamber. Obviously, a 
small number of seats is then left to be allocated. This is done as fol-
lows. "Successively every time one of the remaining seats is allocated to 
the party which, after allocation, shows the greatest number of votes per 
seat" (system of the greatest means, introduced by Hagenbach-Bischoff). 
An example may enlighten this procedure. Let there be 5 parties 
A,B,C,D and E. Suppose there are 20 representatives to be elected. and the 
total number of votes is 1000, according to Table 1. The quota Q amounts 
to 1000/20 = 50. 
Table 1 
·Party Number of Number of V Number of V Number of 
votes represent- R'+l represent- R"+l represent-
V atives R' atives R" atives R 
A 528 10 48 1 1 44 1 1 
B 205 4 41 4 41 4 
C 180 3 45 3 45 4 
D 84 l 42 1 42 1 
E ".l .J 
-- - - -
Total 1000 18 1 9 20 
From the total in the third column it appears that two seats are 
still to be allocated. In the fourth column for each party the number of 
votes V has been divided by the provisional number of seats (representatives) 
R' + 1. Party A shows the greatest quotient and the first remaining seat is 
allocated to this party. Now a provisional distribution R" comes into play 
(fifth column). The procedure is repeated and it turns out that party C 
is getting the second remaining seat. Then all 20 seats are allocated 
(last column). 
In the election 1977 the possibility for parties to make combinations 
was introduced. In this report we leave this complication out of discussion. 
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The most important and fundamental objection to this system is 
that it works in favour of the greatest parties. It can be seen from Table 
I, but an extreme example in Table 2 makes things still more clear. 
Table 2 
-
Party Number of Number of V Number of 
votes represent- RI +I represent-
V atives R' atives R 
A 900 I 8 47.37 I 9 
B 94 1 47.00 1 
C 6 
-- - -
Total 1000 l 9 20 
The proportion of votes for the parties A and Bis about 9:1, but 
the proportion of the representatives for these parties is 19;1! This 
seems to be unacceptable, whatever political preferences are handled. 
We now give a rigorous proof that this system systematically favours 
the greater parties. Let there be n parties, V. be the number of votes 
1 n 
of the i-th party, V = '· 1 V., and let Li= 1 
parties have scored more than the quota 
V. ~ V. 1 . Suppose that m (m $ n) 1 1+ 
Q (= V/150). Initially, R'. seats are 
1. 
allocated to the i~th party, with R! = entier(V./Q) (i = 1,2, ... ,m). The 
1 1. 
number of remaining votes is denoted by Vj,V2, ... ,V~ (O $Vi< Q). Next, 
the mean number of votes per seat is computed under the assumption that 
one more seat would have been allocated than was done initially. We de-
note these means by g. (i = 1,2, ••• ,m), g. = V./(R~+l). The party with 
1. 1 1. 1 
the greatest mean receives the first remaining seat. The mean of this 
last party is now recomputed on the basis of a number of seats again 
raised by one, and the party which now shows the greatest mean receives 
the second remaining seat. The procedure is continued until all seats are 
allocated. 
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In order to find out how far this system favours the greater parties, 
we compare g. with g. where i < j. A simple calculation shows that g. > g. 
l. J l. J 
if the following inequality is satisfied: 
v! < Q(l - v./V.) + V!(V./V.), 
J Jl. 1.Jl. 
in which case party j certainly does not receive the first remaining seat. 
Whether party i receives this seat or not, depends on the other parties. 
As an example we assume that party i has ten times the number of 
votes of party j, so that V./V. = 1/10. Then the above inequality may be 
J l. 
put into words as follows: the smaller party j certainly does not receive 
the first remaining seat if its number of remaining votes V! is smaller 
J 
than 90% of Q, irrespective of the number of remaining votes of the greater 
party. Now if we assume that the first remaining seat is allocated to 
party i, then its new mean is g~ = V./(R! + 2). It is easily seen that 
l. 1. l. 
* 1.· f g. > g. 
1. J 
V ! < Q (1 - 2V • /V • ) + V ! (V • /V. ) . 
J Jl. l.Jl. 
Hence, the smaller party certainly does not receive the second remaining 
seat if its number of remaining votes is smaller than 80% of Q, irrespec-
tive of the number of remaining votes of the greater party. 
So there is a clear bias in favour of the greater parties. 
3. THE SYSTEM R.E. 
There is another system, called the R.E. system*) which does not 
show this fault. It has been introduced 1.n 'the Netherlands in 1973 by 
LISMAN [3, see also 4]. This system can be described in four points. 
i) First of all it is determined which parties are to be admitted in 
Parliament. Their number of votes is at least equal to the quota Q. 
ii) Next, the number of votes of each party is divided by the total number 
of votes and multiplied by 150. The votes for parties which do not 
enter Parliament are left out of consideration. The resulting numbers 
(generally no integers) show a distribution of seats which corresponds 
*) The abbreviation R.E. stands for "Rounded off Exact" (distribution). 
It should be remarked that WILLCOX [8] and LAGUE [5] have developed 
another system which, however, leads to the same results as R.E. 
exactly to the distribution of the votes. It is called the exact 
distribution, and the figures sum up to 150 
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1.J.1.) tiOwever, there are onJ.y iuc.cger numbers ot representatives, so that 
we now round off the figures to integers, 2 0.5 upwards and< 0.5 
downwards. If the rounded numbers sum up to 150, then we have arrived 
at the desired distribution of seats. 
iv) It may happen that the numbers sum up to an integer which is slightly 
more or less than 150. The difference is rarely more than one or two. 
In such a case the denominator in step ii) has to be chosen a little 
bit greater or smaller, such that after rounding off the numbers of 
representatives sum up to 150. Such a denominator can always be found. 
It is an essential feature of the system R.E. that during this procedure 
the mutual proportions of the votes remain the same. Moreover, the system 
is free from the problem of remaining seats. 
The system R.E. may be demonstrated by the following example (Table 3). 
We start from the same data as in Table 1. The parties A,B,C and Dare 
admitted. The third column refers to a distribution of seats which corres-
ponds exactly to the numbers of votes recorded to the four parties. The 
figures are rounded off and they appear to sum up to 21. The division by 
Tin the third column has to be repeated with a somewhat greater denominator 
(T' = 1010) in order to obtain a sum of 20 seats. 
Table 3 
Party Number of Number of Representatives 
votes 
Exact Rounded off Exact Rounded off 
V 
V V - x20 R' 1 , x2o R T 
A 528 10.59 1 1 10.46 10 
B 205 4. 1 1 4 4.06 4 
C 180 3.61 4 3.56 4 
D 84 1.69 2 1.66 2 
-- - - -
Total 997 20 21 20 
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It must be emphasized that in this case, with an increase of Tin 
order to obtain a sum of 20, the greater party A -moving downwards- loses 
one seat. If, however, we would have a decrease of T for this purpose, one 
of the greater parties -moving upwards- would receive one seat. This demons-
trates the neutrality of the system R.E .• 
As a final remark it may be stated that votes for parties which are 
not admitted to Parliament are lost. In the present system, however, they 
flow over to a certain extent to the greater parties. In the R.E.system 
they have no function at all. In order to create a destination for these 
lost votes it might be considered appropriate to give the electors the 
opportunity to present a second vote, referring to a second party if the 
first is not admitted. 
In Table 4 an illustration is given of the elections in 1977. The 
number of representatives is given according to the present system and to 
the system R.E. as well. The shift to the greater parties is clear. 
Table 4 
Party Number of 
· Number of Representatives 
votes V Present system System R.E. 
I 2 183 793 53 52 
2 2 655 391 49 49 
3 1 492 689 28 27 
4 452 423 8 8 
5 177 010 3 3 
6 143 481 2 3 
7 140 910 3 3 
8 79 421 l 2 
9 77 972 1 1 
10 69 914 1 1 
11 59 487 1 1 
-- --
8 .162 491 150 150 
others 158 234 
8 320 725 
We thiak •-iiat politicians of various signature will prefer the ,as-
trib,,;_i_on according to the system R.E •. For instance: the proportion of 
t>c L, ,nbers of votes for party l and 2 respectively amounts to l .060. As 
to the numbers of representatives the proportion amounts to 1.082 for the 
present system and 1.061 for the system R.E.! 
As to the example given in Table 2 the system R.E. leads to 18 repre-
sentatives for party A and 2 for party B, which is far better than the 
rather unacceptable result according to the present system. 
4. MINIMIZING PROCEDURES 
Besides the two systems for allocation of seats in Parliament there 
are others, but they all are to a certain extent pragmatic. 
However, some optimization procedure, designed for this purpose, 
would be more fundamental. A starting point is that the distribution of 
seats should fit that of the votes "as close as possible". This asks for 
minimization of some inequality coefficient, under two constraints: the 
numbers of representatives are integers, and they sum up to 150. 
We shall discuss here three systems which minimize some inequality 
coefficient. The exact distribution of seats R! shall always be given by 
1. 
v. 
R) = --1-- X 150 
1. n 
( i = l , 2 , ••• , n) , 
Iv. 
i= 1 1. 
so that \n R' = 1so*). Generally, of course, the R' are no integers For li=l i i . 
simplicity, we shall not take into account the voting-threshold (in that 
case we generally have l R' < 150). It suffices to say here that the 
1. 
voting-threshold does not cause any essential complications with respect 
to the systems to be discussed here. 
a. The first inequality coefficient is the sum of the absolute values 
of the differences. So we have to find positive numbers R. such that the 
1. 
following three conditions are fulfilled: 
n 
i) L · IR. - R! I is minimal, 
. 1 1 1. 
1.= 
*) The reader should realize that the meaning of the symbol R! differs 
l. 




t11) rhe R. are integers. 
1 
It is easy to seE• that the solution (when no ties are present) is given by 




Allocate entier(R!) seats to party 1. (i = I ,2, •.. ,n). 
l 
(Then still l 50 - L entier(R'.) seats are to be allocated.) 
1. 
Arrange the parties in order of the values of the fractions 
R! - entier(R!), from the highest to the lowest. Allocate the 
l 1 
first remaining seat to the party showing the greatest fraction, 
the second seat to the party which follows, etc., until all re-
maining seats are allocated. 
Principally, this system corresponds to the system introduced in The 
Netherlands by ROGET [3]. 
The algorithm sometimes produces the same distribution of seats as 
R.E. (see Table 5, case I), sometimes it yields different, very strange 
results (see Table 5, case 2, party D). 
Table 5 
Case l 
Party R' 1st step 2nd step System R.E. 
R R 
A 10.75 10 (0. 7 5) l l I l 
B 5.75 5 (0.75) 6 6 
C l 2.2 2 2 2 D r 1.3 I I I -- - - -




Party R' 1st step 2nd step System R.E. 
R R 
A 10.25 10 10 11 
B 5.25 5 5 5 
C 3.2 3 3 3 
D 1 .3 l (0.3) 2 I 
-- - - -
Total 20 19 20 20 
Another disadvantage of minimizing the absolute differences is demon-
strated by the so-called "Alabama Paradox" [2]. Given a distribution R! 
1 
and the corresponding allocation of seats R .• Now it is decided to increase 
1 
the total number of representatives with l (this is relevant, for instance, 
for the U.S.A., but not for the Netherlands). When again the seats are allo-
cated, it is possible that a party loses one seat! An example is given in 
Table 6. Party Closes one seat when the total number of representatives 
is brought from 100 to 101. This is unacceptable. It can be proved that in 
the system R.E. this phenomenon cannot occur. 
Table 6 
Party R' R R' R 
A 45.29 45 45. 74 46 
B 44.20 44 44.64 45 
C 10.51 JI 10.62 10 
--- - --- --
Total 100 100 I 01 101 
ii) 
b. The s,::cnd ine:;uality coefficient we consider is the sum of the abso-
h:te 1,,al1ws oi the 11eZ,-::.t.·fre differences. The problem may now be formulated 
as fol l.ows: to find positive numbers Ri such that the following three con-
ditions 3re fulfilled: 
n 
i) ) :R. - R'. i/R! _, minimal, L 1 l l i• l 
n 
ii) ) R. = 150 and 
i~ l 1 
iii) the R. are integers. 
l 
It can easily be proved that the solution (when no ties are present) is 







Allocate round(R!) seats to party i (i = 1,2, ..• ,n) (by round(x) 
1 
we mean the nearest to x integer). If a= l round(R!) = 150 we 
1 
are ready. If a< 150 go to step 2, else go to step 3. 
For each party compute the increase of the sum of the absolute 
values of the, relative differences caused by adding one seat to 
the number of seats. Allocate one seat to the party which 
causes the srnad.est increase. Repeat step 2 (the party which 
gained the last seat again competes) until all (150) seats are 
allocated. 
For each party compute the increase of the sum of the absolute 
values of the relative differences caused by subt~acting one seat 
from the number of seats. Take away one seat from the party 
which causes the smallest increase. Repeat step 3 (the party 
which lost the last seat again competes) until no more than 150 
seats are allocated. 
This minimization procedure is not the same as R.E .. There are cases 
showing remarkable differences, like that in Table 7. Perhaps one may 
prefer the distribution according to the system R.E., but it seems a 




Step Step 2 Step 2 
I 
Syst"'m R.E. 
Increase! R R 
1 ') 
I~• 
l ,, .. 0.08160 l J 0.08326 14 3 
2 0.08333 2 2 3 
C 1 ~ 40 O. l 4286 
D ] . 40 0.14286 
E l. 40 0.14286 
L 0. 5827 
18 ! 9 20 20 
As for a possible generalization of the minimization systems!!. and.!?_ we 
remark that it can easily be proved that the distributions of seats produced 
by algorithms ABSDIF and ABSREI..DIF also minimize the inequality coefficients 
'.\' 1R. - R'icl and )(JR. - R!i/R~)a, respectivelv, for any given positive 
, ... , l l-i 1 ~~~. 1. l.' 1 .. 
re,! l number ci. 
c. The third minimization system we will discuss is based on the inequa-
lity coefficient by THEIL [6], which is developed within the concepts of 
information theory. For a concise and brief introduction into this approach 
we quote THEIL [7,p.521]. The reader should notice tnat in Theil's paper p. 
l 
and q. correspond to our R: and R. (apart from a factor 150), and that 
l l. 1 
;,'i;,,:::: '!B r:ceded in the fi1,st plaee is a measm'e 1;.1hich desc1°ibes the 
-:::,J :.ihieh the totaZ is subdivided. A natw•al and weU-known measu1•e., 
!:,ws:'i ~.-1: ,_fot:~fepts from inj"or'l"OCZtion theory~ is the ent1•opy. For the frac-
( 2. !) 






p. log p. 
l. ]. 
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which is nonnegative and which vanishes if and oniy if p. = 1 for some i 
1. 
(and hence p. = 0 for j Ii). The maximum is log n, which is attained when 
J 
the p. 's are aii equai to 1/n. Thus, the entropy takes the smaiiest vaiue 
1. 
when the scene is dominated compieteiy by one group {which amounts to a 
minimum of "dividedness 11 ) and the forgest vaiue when aU groups are of 
equai size; and this maximum, log n, increases in turn when the number of 
groups (n) increases. We shall exclude the possibility that H is equai to 
p 
either Zimit: 
(2.2) 0 < H < log n. 
p 
If H = 0, then some p. is equal to one and all others are zero. Clearly, 
p 1. 
there exists no reasonable way of assigning parliament seats to parties 
which did not receive any vote at all. If H = log n, all n parties re-
p 
ceived the same number of votes, and there exists no reasonable way of 
allocating parZiament seats to these parties on another than equal basis. 
But if H satisfies the constraint (2.2), as is normally the case, 
p 
one can conceive of a set of parliamentary fractions q 1, ••• ,qn whose entropy 
n 
(2.3) H = - l 
q i= I 
q. log q. 
1. 1. 
differs from H. Obviously~ if we fix H at a pre-assigned level, we still 
p q 
have freedom as to the choice of q1, ••• ,qn when n ~ 2, and we would like 
to choose the q's as closely to the corresponding p's as is possibZe. 
Given that the informational concepts H and H are used to measure p q 
11dividedness 11, a natural way of specifying "as close as possible" is the 
following. Consider p 1, ••• ,pn as the prior probabilities of n events and 
imagine that a message arrives which indicates that the odds in favor of 
these events have changed to the extent that the new {posterior) probabiZi-
ties are q 1, ••• ,qn. The expected information of this message is defined in 










where q and p on the left stand for q 1 , ••• ,qn and p 1 , ••• ,pn' respectively. 
'l'he information expectation is never negative. It vanishes if and only if 
p. = q. for each i, and it takes larger and larger values when the p's and 
1. l. 
q's are paiY'Wise more different. 
This becomes particularly clear when I(q: p) is expanded according 
to powers of (q. - p.)/p .. If we use natural logarithms (which is done 
l. l. l. 











provided that the p's and q's are pairwise sufficiently close to each 
other (so that the expansions converge). The right-hand side of this 
approximation is proportional to a chi-square with the p's as theoreti-
cal probabilities and the q's as observed frequencies. 
The information expectation (2.4) is a measure for the degree to 
which we are surprised when we are informed that the prior probabilities 
p 1, ••• ,p are replaced by the posterior probabilities q , .•. ,q. Interpret n l n 
now the p. 's again as the proportions of the votes cast on the various 
1 
parties and the q.'s as the corresponding proportions of parliamentary 
1 
seats. Obviously, the electorate ought to be surprised as little as 
possible. 
Actually, it turns out (see below) that the system R.E. does mini-




over all integers R1,R2 , .•• ,R0 which sum up to 150. Now this sum is the 
same (apart from a factor I /300) as the above given approximation of I (q : p) 
by Theil. So we can conclude that the system R.E. in first approximation 
minimizes the degree to which one is surprised when one is informed that 
the exact distribution given by Ri_,R2, ... ,R~ is replaced by R1 ,R2 , ..• ,Rn. 
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We will show now for a simple case that indeed the system R.E. mini-
mizes the sum(*), from which a general proof is easily constructed. The 
first step in R.E. is to take R. = round(R!), where R! = (V. x 150)/V and 
1. 1. 1. 1. 
V = '~ 1 V .. Then clearly the sum(*) is minimal, but sometimes the R. do l i= l. 1 
not sum up to 150. We suppose IR.= 149. Then in R.E. the denominator Vin 
1 
R'. is replaced by a new denominator v* < V such that the new R! after round-
1. 1 
ing sum up to 150. But replacing the denominator V by v* is the same as 















Secondly, we observe that increasing R. by one causes an increase of the 
1. 




(R.-R!) 2 R.+0.5 




l. ( R! ) be assumed by party i 0 (and by no other party). 
1 
that if we choose c such that 
R. +0.5 
{ 
R. +1.5 R.+0.5 } ' 10 :s; min 1.0 min 1. R! C < R'. R! 
1.0 10 J:s;i:s;n 1. 
Wi 0 
then multiplying all RJ_ by c and rounding has the effect that Rio will 




With respect to the present system it is interesting to know that it 




This can easily be proved following the lines of the minimality proof for 
the system R.E. It seems to be difficult to think of reasons on the ground 
of which one should prefer this sum to(*). 
It should be kept in mind that in the last resorc the (very difficult) 
decision which system is to be preferred, has to be left to the politicians. 
or policy makers. It is the responsibility of the mathematicians to design 
systems with desired properties (as far as possible), and to analyze the 
mathematical properties of these systems. 
We close this paragraph by a remark about disproportional allocation. 
Some ten years ago GROSFELD [I] made the suggestion to take squares of the 
numbers of votes before starting the allocation procedure. The result is a 
diminishing number of seats for the smaller parties, which was generally 
felt desirable at that time. The disproportionality works in favour of the 
greater parties, which may be clear by comparing e.g. I, 2, 3, 15, 20 with 
I, 4, 9, 225, 400. 
Later this suggestion has been put into a broad and sophisticated 
mathematical framework by THEIL [7], who developed a general design of 
the above disproportionality by 
a 
p. 
1 q. = , 
1 n l . a p. 
i=l 1 
where p. corresponds to our V., q. is a new starting number R' (apart 
1 1 1 i 
from a factor 150) and a is some positive real number. 
The suggestion made by Grosfeld was a= 2. However, there are other 
possibilities, which may be chosen in all kinds of election and allocation 
problems. It may be of interest to see how this is done in the IFORS voting 
system. We therefore quote THEIL again [7, p.519]. By "The square system 
(I.I)" Theil means Grosfeld's.case a= 2. 
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It is i1zte1:,esting in this connection that the International Federation 
of Op,n•ational Resear>ch Societies ( IFORS) faces a similar pr>oblem but in 
p~ecisely the opposite dir>ection. The problem is that the national member 
societies are of vePy unequal size, so that IFORS could be dominated more 
or less pemanently by the societies of one or two countries if propor-
tional representation based on national membership were applied. To pre-
vent this, a rule has been adopted which gives each member society a num-
ber of votes proportional to the square root of the number of members: 
n 





i = 1 , ••• , n 
where n is the number> of member' societies, p. the i th society's share 
1 
of total membePship, and q. its share in the IFORS voting procedure. Thus, 
. .th . 1 th 
~f the 1 soc~ety has four> times as many members as the j , the number 
of its votes is only twice as lar>ge. 
The squ.ar>e (l.l) and the square-root system (I.3) are both special 
cases of 
n 
( L 4) Cl q. = p./ 





]_ = I , ••• , n. 
A specification a> l serves to raise the size of the larger groups and to 
reduce that of the smaller groups, whereas a< I has the opposite effect. 
The latter variant is sometimes used to protect geographical minorities. 
The IFORS case is one example; the U.S. Senate is another, since it gives 
equal representation to all 50 states independent of their population. 
Thus, if p. stands for the number of voters of the i th state measured as 
]_ 
a fraction of the national total and q. for the proportion of Senators 
1. 
allocated to this state (1/50), (1.4) applies to this case when we specify 
Cl= 0. 
There are thus seveY'al examples of the representation system (1.4): 
a= 0 (U.S. Senate), a=! (IFORS), a= I (propor-tional representation), 
and a= 2 (Mr. Grosfeld's proposal), plus the case a= 00 (i.e., allocating 
all seats to the ruling paY'ty), a procedure used in some of the democrati-
cally less advanced countries. 
l7 
5 THE WEIGHTED VOTE 
In the light of the first four lines of HUNTINGTON's paper [2]: 
In the absence of any provision for fractional representation in Congress, 
the constitutional requirement that the number of representatives of each 
state shall be proportional to the population of that state cannot he 
carried out exactly;, 
we think it to be relevant to cite here Theorem VIII of the first author's 
doctor's thesis: 
Consider a house chosen by democratic elections such that on the basis 
of proportional representation N seats (N ~ 1) are allocated ton parties 
"in a way as fair as possible", in the proportion R1 : R2 •••• R n 
(R. E IN, 2R. = N). Suppose that according to the results 
1. 1. 
of the elections 
the seats should have been divided in the proportion Rj RI • • R' 2 • • • • • n 
(R! E Q, 2R! = N). Then in case of votings in the house 
1. 1 
it should be 
strongly recorronended to give the voting weight R!/R. to the votes of any 
J. 1 
representative of party i, instead of the usual weight 1. 
The great advantage of the weighted vote will be clear: the represen-
tation of the votes of the electorate in the house is perfect, as it should 
be, and independent of the system of allocation of the seats. 
In systems with a voting-threshold there are two possibilities to 
define the voting weight. It can either be based only on the votes of the 
parties admitted to Parliament, or it can be based on all the votes recor-
ded by the electorate. We think that both cases can be defended. 
In Table 8 we give the voting weights for both cases in the results 
of the elections of 1977 for the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament. We 
derive from it two examples of the importance of this correction. 
E:.· Assume that for approval of a certain proposal a majority of 2/3 is 
required. Now let all representatives vote for the proposal, except those 
of parties 2 and 8. The result is that the proposal is accepted with a 
majority of 100 votes for and 50 against. If we use the weighting votes 
in the first case, the number of votes for approval amounts to 99.7433, 
so that the proposal is to be rejected. 
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b. In ~he second case we have the curious phenomenon that parties 2 and 
3 together have gained 4148080/8320725 x 100% = 49.852% of the votes of 
the electorate (which counts for 74.78 seats), whereas they have 77 of the 
150 seats in Parliament. 
The weighted votes would correct these unfairnesses of the system 
perfectly. 
Table 8 
Party Number of Number of First case Second case 
votes represent-
V atives R~ Voting R'. Voting 
l. weight l. weight 
R. R!/R. R!/R. 
l. l. l. l. l. 
l 2 813 793 53 51.7084 0.9756 50.7250 0.9571 
2 2 655 391 49 48.7974 0.9959 47. 8695 0.9769 
3 I 492 689 28 27.4308 0.9797 26.9091 0.9610 
4 452 423 8 8.3141 l. 0393 8. 1560 1.0195 
5 177 010 3 3.2529 1 .0843 3.1910 1 • 0637 
6 143 481 2 2. 6367 1. 3184 2.5866 1. 2933 
7 140 910 3 2.5895 0.8632 2.5402 0.8467 
8 79 421 1 1. 4595 1 • 4595 1.4317 1.4317 
9 77 972 1 1 • 4329 1 .4329 1. 4056 1. 4056 
10 69 914 ! 1. 2848 1.2848 1.2604 1.2604 
1 1 59 487 1 1. 0932 1.0932 1.0724 1. 0724 
-
8 162 491 150 150.0002 147.1475 
others 158 234 
Total 8 320 725 
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The system of the weighted vote should be (and can easily be) 
realized in practice as an automatic system: Each representative will have 
two buttons at his disposal, one for voting for and one for voting against. 
The votes recorded by the representatives are summed automatically, each 
with its proper weight, The result of the voting is displayed at the 
Chairman's desk almost innnediately after the voting. Once in every four 
years only the weights will have to be changed in this automatic system. 
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